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•

In observing the work of lawyers in the courts in which I
have served and in other courts, I have generally been impressed
with the service that the bar has rendered in.the representation
of clients.

I have not been quite so impressed, however, with

the performance of the bar in the discharge of its duty to
society as a whole.

It is the willingness to accept this public

responsibility function that distinguishes the bar as a
profession.

The value of the calling is diminished to the extent

that any one lawyer shirks his or her professional obligation of
service to the community.
There are many duties implicated in the concept of public
responsibility -- the duty to undertake the representation of
indigent clients without charge {if more lawyers performed this
duty, perhaps the public expense for such representation could be
greatly reduced or eliminated); the duty to see that able and
honest men and women are appointed and elected as judges; the
duty to aid in the improvement of legal education; the duty to
maintain the competence and integrity of the bar, and to disclose
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violations of the rules of professional conduct; the duty to set
an example and maintain public confidence by avoiding even minor
violations of law; the duty to seek legislative and
administrative changes to improve the law and the legal system;
and the duty to educate the public and to protect it from the
unauthorized practice of law.
Another duty, and the one upon which I intend to focus my
remarks tonight, is the duty to criticize the courts.

It is my

premise that informed criticism of the courts and their decisions
is not merely a right but an ethical obligation imposed upon
every member of the bar.

I also hold that judges should not

respond to such criticism, and in fact should never express any
extra-judicial opinion regarding legal or constitutional issues
that may come before the courts.
There is a Canon in the Code of Professional Responsibility
that instructs lawyers to assist in improving the legal system.
The Ethical Considerations relating to that Canon observe that
lawyers are especially qualified to recognize deficiencies in the
system and to initiate corrective measures.

They encourage the

legal profession to support changes in the law when existing

rules eventuate in unjust results.

The Preamble to the new Model

Rules of Professional Conduct adopted by the American Bar
Association urges that lawyers should employ their knowledge to
reform the law.

In my opinion these admonitions speak to a duty

on the part of lawyers to identify and discuss incorrect actions
by the courts, subject only to the requirement that the criticism
be impelled by a good-faith desire for improvement in the law and
the legal system.
I do not speak here of malicious or false statements about a
judge or of disruptive or contemptuous conduct in the courtroom.
These never can be countenanced, and I have kept with me for
nearly thirty years a case I read in law school regarding a
penalty imposed for behavior of this type.

The decision is taken

from the ancient English Reports and is one of those collected by
Sir James Dyar, sometime Chief Justice of Common Pleas.
reported as follows:

It is

"RICHARDSON, Chief Justice of C.B. at the

assizes at Salisbury in the summer of 1631 was assaulted by a
prisoner condemned there for felony, who after his condemnation
threw a brick bat at the said Judge, which narrowly missed; and
for this an indictment was immediately drawn • • • against the
prisoner, and his right hand cut off and fixed to the gibbet,
upon which he was himself immediately hanged in the presence of
the Court."

It seems to me that the judge overreacted somewhat

in spite of the provocation.

Of course, there are those who

today would consider tossing a brick to be "protected expression.•
I do realize that it sometimes is necessary for a lawyer to bite
his or her tongue when in the presence of some particularly
arbitrary tyrant in a black robe.

My father, who has been

practicing law for sixty years, holds in the highest regard the
lawyer who made some intemperate remark during a long and heated
argument with a judge.

When the judge shouted:

"Counsellor,you

have been showing your contempt of this court," the lawyer
responded:

"No, your honor, I have been trying to conceal it."

While lawyers generally feel free to criticize the state of
the law in relation to rules of court, statutes and even the
Constitution itself, there is a noticeable reluctance to
criticize judge-made law, specific judicial decisions or
individ~al

judges.

Yet, the public responsibility function of

the bar is just as implicated in the latter as in the former.
Why the distinction?
(

I think that the answer lies in the

unfortunate, but well-grounded, fear that affronts to tender
judicial sensibilities may result in unnecessary antagonisms,
disciplinary action or worse.

For example, in 1830, Judge James

H. Peck of the United States District Court for the District of
Missouri disbarred and imprisoned a lawyer for publishing a
letter critical of one of his decisions.

Although this

disgraceful episode led to an impeachment proceeding and caused
Congress to curtail the summary contempt power of the federal
courts, echoes of the Peck case were heard in a decision handed
down by the Supreme Court at its last term.

The decision

reversed a six-month suspension from federal practice imposed
upon Robert J. Snyder by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals for

conduct said to be prejudicial to the administration of justice
and unbecoming a member of the bar.

Snyder's difficulties

stemmed from a letter he wrote to the United States District
Court for the District of North Dakota.

The letter was written

after the circuit court had twice returned his Criminal Justice
Act fee application for insufficient documentation.

In his

correspondence, Snyder refused to provide further information,
generally criticized the inadequacy of the fees authorized in
similar cases, expressed his disgust at the treatment afforded to
him by the circuit and directed that his name be removed from the
list of attorneys available for criminal defense assignments.
The district court judge, finding nothing offensive in the
letter, and perceiving some merit in Snyder's criticisms, passed
the letter on to the circuit.

A three-judge panel of the circuit

ultimately found that the statement, which Snyder refused to
retract, was disrespectful, contentious and beyond the bounds of
proper comment and criticism.
In reversing the panel decision, Chief Justice Burger wrote:
"We do not consider a lawyer's criticism of the administration
of the [Criminal Justice] Act or criticism of inequities in
assignments under the Act as cause for discipline or suspension.
• • •

Officers of the court may appropriately express criticism

on such matters."

The Chief Justice observed that the circuit

court had acknowledged the meritorious nature of Snyder's

criticism and, as a result, had instituted a study of the
administration of the Criminal Justice Act.

In light of that

observation, I believe that the Chief Justice missed an excellent
opportunity to comment on the attorney's duty to criticize the
courts and the beneficial purposes served by the performance of
that duty.

Snyder's actions were well within the bounds of the

public responsibility he assumed when he became a member of the
bar.

This is so because a lawyer is obliged not only to educate

the public about the law, the legal system and the judges but to
inform the courts as well.
Justice Jackson once wrote that "criticism by the profession
is one of the most important criteria in appraising a decision's
real weight in subsequent cases. •

Justice Brewer said:

"It is a

mistake to suppose that the Supreme Court is either honored or
helped by being spoken of as beyond criticism.

On the contrary,

the life and character of its justices should be the objects of
constant watchfulness by all, and its judgments subject to the
freest criticism."

"I have no patience," said Chief Justice

Harlan F. Stone, "with the complaint that criticism of judicial
action involves any lack of respect for the courts.

When the

courts deal, as ours do, with great public questions, the only
protection against unwise decisions and even judicial usurpation,
is careful scrutiny of their action and fearless comment upon
it."

And so it is that when the Attorney General of the United
States publicly criticizes certain decisions of the Supreme
Court, as he has done in recent months, he is acting in the
highest traditions of the legal profession.

By leading serious

discussions of constitutional doctrine important to the citizenry
and to the courts, he performs the public service encouraged by
Justices Jackson, Brewer and Stone.

It ill behooves members of

the bar to ridicule and abuse a fellow member of the profession
for fostering the robust and uninhibited debate that is the
hallmark of a free society.

When Stephen A. Douglas denounced

Abraham Lincoln for questioning the validity of the infamous Dred
Scott decision, Lincoln replied as follows:

•we believe as much

as [Mr.] Douglas (perhaps more) in obedience to and respect for
the judicial department of government.

We think its decisions on

constitutional questions, when fully settled, should control not
only the particular case decided, but the general policy of the
country, subject to be disturbed only by amendments of the
Constitution, as provided in that instrument itself.
this would be revolution.
is erroneous.

More than

But we think the Dred Scott decision

We know the court that made it has often

overrruled its own decisions, and we shall do what we can to have
it overrule this."

Lincoln was a great lawyer who well

understood the public responsibility of the bar.

It has never been the place of a judge, however, to respond
to specific criticism, and I think that it is unseemly for
Justices of the Supreme Court to engage in public argument with
the Attorney General or any other lawyer for the purpose of
defending the position of the Court on one issue or another.
Such discourse not only detracts from the dignity of the court
but also communicates an unwillingness to maintain the openness
of mind so essential for the proper performance of the judicial
role.

When the judiciary undertakes a point-by-point defense of

criticism leveled by members of the bar, it discourages what it
should encourage and protect.

Even in the case of unfair and

unjust criticism, the bench must remain silent, leaving to the
bar its ethical obligation to come to the defense of the
judiciary in such situations.
The judiciary should assure the bar that critical comments
of all kinds are welcomed.

It should heed the message of Justice

Frankfurter that "judges must be kept mindful of their
limitations and of their ultimate public responsibility by a
vigorous stream of criticism expressed with candor however blunt."
The Justices of the Supreme Court and of every other court in the
land must recognize, as did Frankfurter, that lawyers "are under
a special responsibility to exercise fearlessness" in criticizing
the courts.

When Justice Brennan wrote in the Sawyer case that

"lawyers are free to criticise the state of the law," he reserved
no rebuttal time for the judiciary.
I believe that judges generally are too free in giving their
out-of-court opinions on matters that may eventually be put
before them for decision.

Several years ago, a colleague of mine

who has served for many years on the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals wrote a piece for the New York Times entitled "Judges
Must Speak Out."

Ever since I read that essay, I have been

contemplating a companion piece entitled:

"Judges Must Shut Up."

It has long been accepted that no judge should become
committed on any issue of fact or law until that issue is
properly presented to the judge in the course of an actual case
or controversy.

The rule is a simple but salutary one.

It

communicates to those on either side of an issue that a logical
and well-constructed argument might carry the day in persuading
an impartial court to a desired conclusion.

It communicates that

the judge has no fixed agenda and is receptive to new ideas and
approaches (and even to old ideas and approaches) on a
case-by-case basis.

It lends confidence to those with actual

disputes to be resolved, and it reinforces the beneficial rule
set down by Francis Bacon in his essay "Of Judicature":

"Judges

ought to remember that their office is jus dicere and not jus
dare; to interpret law, and not to make law, or give law."

In the same essay, Bacon said:
well-tuned cymbal."

"An overspeaking judge is no

Unfortunately, many of these poorly tuned

instruments continue to play, rendering decisions and giving
opinions when they are not officially asked to do so and
consequently disturbing the confidence necessary for the
effective operation of the judiciary.

Let me hasten to add that

there are numerous matters upon which judges can and should be
heard -- matters affecting administration of the legal system,
procedural rules and ethical standards.

A judge also should

teach and write about the law in an expository way, pointing to
trends and changes in decisions already written and in
legislation already adopted.

A judge should encourage debate

about controversial constitutional and legal issues without
participating in the debate.

I have lectured and written about

the public accountability of judges -- the need for judges to
report to the citizenry about developments in the law and the
legal system.
avoided.

In all these activities, however, opinions must be

Such opinions manifest the disease of judicial activism

in one of its most virulent forms.

Lawyers, law professors and

law students must be the advocates, debaters and opinion molders.
As for judges -- even those former academics who find it so
difficult to doff the academic gown -- by their official
decisions alone must they be known.

I have enjoyed being with you tonight and meeting so many
bright young law students.

In light of the upcoming bicentennial

of the Constitution, the objectives of your organization take on
a special significance.

I believe that your interest in an

historical examination of the sources, meaning and intentions
behind our great Charter is very much in order, although others
say that such an undertaking has little relevance to modern law
and society.

To my mind, a concern for the principles of

federalism and the separation of powers is not linked to any one
political party or philosophy.

As you all know, the federal

judiciary was conceived of as the least dangerous branch, the
weakest of the three departments of power, limited to an
interpretive function, with no influence over the sword or purse.
When the judiciary oversteps its constitutional bounds, it merits
censure from the bar, and court decisions that are not guided by
constitutional principles likewise deserve condemnation.
Remember always that where there is temperate criticism of the
courts for constructive and positive purposes, grounded in good
faith and reason, the judiciary is strengthened, the rule of law
is reinforced and the public duty of the bar is performed.
Since this is an institution of higher learning, I close
with a final examination.
me the name of the author.

I'll give you a quotation and you tell
Here's the quotation:

"The Court ••

• has improperly set itself up as • • • a superlegislature • • •

11

reading into the Constitution words and implications which are
not there, and which were never intended to be there. • • •

We

want a Supreme Court which will do justice under the Constitution
-- not over it.•

The name of the author is -- Franklin D.

Roosevelt.
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Cranch) 267 (1806), a court does not
have diversity jurisdiction over a
suit by a plaintiff against a partnership in which any partner's citizenship is identical to that of the
plaintiff."~

Judge Lasker, therefore, dismissed
the complaint finding that a number
. o~ partners of defendant Solomon
Brothers were. like plaintiff, citizens
of New Jersey. He rejected an argument that the non-diverse partners
be dropped under Rule 19(b) as "nonindispensable." 111 He also rejected an
argument that partnerships in disso-

lack of diversity between the plaintiff
and some of the defendant partners.12
Permissive Counterclaims
Nadja de Magalhaes Spencer v.
Banco Real, S.A., et al.,n decided by
Judge Kram on Dec. 10, underscored
the ·need for an independent jurisdictional basis for permissive counterclaims. In this case, originally
brought as a Title VII action, Judge
Kram dismissed a counterclaim
which she found to be permissive
rather than compulsory for lack of
independent jurisdictional grounds.

against an opposing party. Such unrelated counterclaims are referred to
as permissive, since a party need not
plead them, but instead may bring a ·
Separate action on the claim in the
forum of his own choosing. H arri8,
571 F. 2d at 121-22. However, If a per·
missive couriterclaim is raised in a
federal district court, an independent
jurisdictional ground must exist."~
Failure to follow the local Southern
and Eastern District rule governing
interpleader motions resulted in the
denial of leave to file a third-party
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The Federalist Society is composed of judges, lawyers and law students
(as well as lay members) who support the principles of limited
government, and careful separation of governmental powers. Speakers
at past Federalist Society events have included Chief Justice Burger,
Justice Rehnquist, Professor Emeritus Raoul Berger of the Harvard Law
School, Professor Richard Epstein of the University of Chicago Law
School, and others. Information concerning the Society can be obtained
by calling (202) 822-8138; or by writing to -the New York Chapter at 80
Wall Street, Suite 1015, N.Y., N.Y. 10005.

DATE and TIME: FEBRUARY 13th, 6:00P.M.
PLACE: HYATT HOTEL, Alvin Room, Conference Level
(THE HYATT HOTEL IS NEXT TO GRAND CENTRAL STATION)

